Land & Water Law Review
Volume 18

Issue 2

Article 3

1983

Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas: State Control of Water
under the Constraints of the Commerce Clause
Anne B. Tallmadge

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water

Recommended Citation
Tallmadge, Anne B. (1983) "Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas: State Control of Water under the
Constraints of the Commerce Clause," Land & Water Law Review: Vol. 18 : Iss. 2 , pp. 513 - 537.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss2/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Land & Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming
Scholarship.

Tallmadge: Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas: State Control of Water unde

SPORHASE v. NEBRASKA ex rel. DOUGLAS:
STATE CONTROL OF WATER UNDER
THE CONSTRAINTS OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Historically, water in the arid West has been successfully
apportioned among competing demands by an intricate legal
system developed and managed almost entirely by the states.'
Today, the ability of a state to effectively manage and utilize
water to achieve desired social and economic conditions remains contingent upon the extent to which the state may control or influence the disposition and use of its most valued
natural resource.
In recent years, energy, industrial development, and a
rapidly growing population have contributed to increase greatly the demands upon western water resources. 2 Quantification
of federal reserved rights,3 and legislative provisions designed
to safeguard the environment through preservation of instream flows and salinity control have also increased demand
4
for the scarce resource.
Many states have responded by enacting legislation that
restricts or conditions the use of water for both intrastate and
interstate purposes. 5 The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,6 calls the
validity of many restrictive state water laws into question.
In Sporhase, for the first time, the Supreme Court
declared that groundwater is an article of commerce, and is
Copyright© 1983 by the University of Wyoming.
1. In the discussion of issues concerning water, the western states are the 17 contiguous

states that follow the doctrine of prior appropriation in the allocation of their water

resources. These states are: Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota,

Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.
2. See WYOMING WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FIVE YEAR WATER
RESOURCES RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR WYOMING (July

1981).
3. In Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the Supreme Court acknowledged the
power of the federal government to reserve the waters on Indian reservations and
exempt them from appropriation under state law. The principle underlying the reservation of waters for Indian reservations was subsequently held applicable to other federal
lands such as national forests and national recreation areas in Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 601 (1963).
4. BALLARD, DEVINE AND ASSOCIATES, WATER AND WESTERN ENERGY: IMPACTS, ISSUES
AND CHOICES 97 (1982).
5, See NEB. REV. STAT. S 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978); S.D. CoMP. LAWS ANN. S 46-5-20.1
(Supp. 1981); Wyo. STAT. S 41-3-104, 105 and 115 (1977).
, 102 S.Ct. 3456 (1982).
6. __
U.S. _
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therefore susceptible to congressional regulation.7 The Court
in Sporhase further held that a Nebraska statute8 which prohibited the export of water to any state that did not provide
reciprocal rights violated the commerce clause of the United
9
States Constitution.
THE SPORHASE DECISION

Facts and ProceedingsBelow
The essential facts in the case arose from a set of fairly
simple localized circumstances. Nebraska sought to conserve
diminishing supplies of groundwater through a statutory
scheme which provided, in part, that a transfer of Nebraska
groundwater across state lines was allowable only when a permit was obtained from the Nebraska Department of Water
Resources.' ° The permit statute provided that the Director of
the Water Resources Department could issue a permit only
upon a finding that the proposed transfer 1) was reasonable, 2)
was not contrary to the conservation and use of groundwater,
3) was not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare, and 4)
the state into which the groundwater was proposed to be
transferred granted reciprocal rights providing for the
transfer of groundwater from that state into Nebraska.'
Joy Sporhase and his son-in-law and partner, Delmar
Moss, owned and farmed contiguous tracts of land in Nebraska
and Colorado. 12 A well located on the Nebraska tract was used
to pump water for irrigation of both the Colorado tract and the
Nebraska tract. 13 The well was properly registered with the
State of Nebraska, 14 but Sporhase and Moss did not apply for
the permit required to transfer groundwater for use outside
the state.' 5
7. Id. at 3463.
8. NEB. REV. STAT. S 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978).
9. 102 S.Ct. at 3467.
10. NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978).
11. NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978).

12. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S.Ct. at 3458 (1982).
13. State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614, 616 (1981).
14. Id.
15. Since Colorado law forbids the transfer of groundwater outside its borders and has no
reciprocity division, CoLO. REV. STAT. S 37-81-101 (1973 & Supp. 1981), the permit required by NEB. REV. STAT. 5 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978), would not have been granted even
if application had properly been made.
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In district court, the State of Nebraska obtained an injunction prohibiting Sporhase and Moss from transporting groundwater into Colorado without the requisite permit. The
16
Nebraska Supreme Court upheld the district court decision,
ruling specifically that groundwater was not subject to free
sale or transfer under Nebraska law, and therefore was not an
article of commerce.' 7 The Chief Justice dissented, viewing the
reciprocity provision of the statute as an undue burden on interstate commerce. 18
The Supreme Court's Opinion
The United States Supreme Court, in a 7-2 decision,
reversed the Nebraska Supreme Court and declared groundwater to be an article of commerce. 19 Rejecting Nebraska's
theory and defense espousing the state ownership of water,
the Court declared that the reciprocity provision of the
Nebraska statute violated the commerce clause of the United
2
States Constitution.

0

The Court's holding was based upon its resolution of three
distinct issues:
1) whether groundwater is an article of commerce and
therefore subject to Congressional regulation; 2)
whether the Nebraska restriction on the interstate
transfer of groundwater imposes an impermissible
burden on commerce; and 3) whether Congress has
granted the states permission to engage in groundwater
21
regulation that otherwise would be impermissible.
The first portion of Justice Stevens' opinion for the majority held that groundwater was, in fact, an article of commerce
and therefore its regulation was subject to the restraints of the
commerce clause.2 2 The State of Nebraska had asserted that

water was owned by the state in its sovereign capacity, and
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

305 N.W.2d at 616.
Id.
Id. at 620.
102 S.Ct. at 3463.
Id. at 3465.
Id. at 3458.
Id. at 3463. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl.3 which provides: "The Congress shall
have the power... to regulate commerce with foreign Nations and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes ......
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accordingly was not an article of commerce. 28 The State relied
upon the Court's decision in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter24 for the proposition that publicly owned resources
were subject to exclusive state regulation and were thus immune to commerce clause attack.
Reviewing the McCarter decision, the Court determined
that the theory of public ownership of natural resources had
been overruled by the Court's decision in Hughes v.
Oklahoma.2 5 Therefore, the Court rejected the Nebraska argument based upon the "legal fiction" of state ownership of
natural resources.2 6 The Court noted that the public ownership
theory with regard to groundwater had previously been rejected as a defense at the district court level in City ofAltus v.
Carr,27 a case which had subsequently received per curiam affirmation by the Court.28
Nebraska sought to distinguish water from natural
resources since, under Nebraska law, water may not be reduced to private ownership for intrastate trade, but remains subject to the ownership interest of the state.2 9 Additionally, the
State asserted a vital interest in the conservation and preservation of scarce water resources because water, unlike other
natural resources, is essential to human survival.30
23. 102 S.Ct. at 3458.
24. 209 U.S. 349 (1908). In Hudson County, the Court upheld a New Jersey statute making it
unlawful to export the waters of the state into any other state for use therein. Id. The
state's alleged "ownership" of the water provided at least partial grounds for the Court's
holding. Id.
25. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). The theory of state ownership of its natural resources (wildlife) was
discounted in Hughes. For an excellent discussion of the Hughes case see, e.g., Hellerstein, Hughes v. Oklahoma: The Court, The Commerce Clause, and State Control of
NaturalResources, 1979 SuP. CT. REv. 51.
26. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3462 (1982).
27. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), affid mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
28. A careful examination of the holding in City of Altus reveals that it did not depart from
the Court's previous position on the state control of water. Texas law was applied to
determine that water was an article of commerce in the Altus case. The holding was
understandable, since in Texas, groundwater, once withdrawn from the ground, may be
freely bought and sold. The Supreme Court in Sporhase recognized this distinction, finding the result in City of Altus to be "not necessarily inconsistent with the Nebraska
Supreme Court's holding.. " 102 S.Ct. at 3461.
29. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3461 (1982). Nebraska has adopted a modified form of
the "Reasonable Use" rule regarding the use of groundwater. In Prather v. Eisenmann,
200 Neb. 1, 261 N.W.2d 766, 769 (1978), the rule was stated that a landowner:
Rs entitled to appropriate subterranean waters found under his land, but he
cannot extract and appropriate them in excess of reasonable and beneficial use
upon the land in which he owns, especially of such use is injurious to others who
have substantial rights to the waters, and if the naturalundergroundsupply is
insufficient for all oumers, each is entitled to a reasonable proportion of the
whole ....
(emphasis in original).
30. 102 S.Ct. at 3462.
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While recognizing that the western states' interest and
asserted superior competence in conserving and preserving
scarce water resources were "not irrelevant in the commerce
clause inquiry," 3 1 the Court also recognized an interstate
dimension to the regulation of groundwater. 32 Pointing to the
worldwide agricultural market for products from irrigated
farms, and the multistate character of many groundwater
aquifers, the Court found that groundwater overdraft may
clearly be viewed as a national problem. Congressional power
to legislate in the area, said the Court, cannot be limited
depending on whether specific state property laws assert state
ownership of water."3
The Court's conclusion that water is an article of commerce gave rise to the necessary inquiry whether the
Nebraska statute placed an unconstitutional burden on the
resource. Applying the traditional commerce clause analysis
described in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,34 the Court answered
in the affirmative.
The majority agreed with the State that the expressed and
genuine purpose of the Nebraska statute-to conserve and
preserve diminishing sources of groundwater-was "unquestionably legitimate and highly important." 35 The Court proclaimed that the criteria expressed by the challenged statute,
other than the reciprocity requirement, served to advance the
State's legitimate purpose, and therefore were not facially
violative of the commerce clause.36 Significantly, the Court
was not concerned that the restrictions applied solely to interstate transfers, justifying the special treatment accorded to
a
transport of water across state lines for four reasons: 1) 37
power;
police
its
of
core
the
at
is
water
of
state's regulation
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 3463.
Id. at 3462.
Id. at 3462-63.
397 U.S. 137 (1970). The determinative test requires:
Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive
in relation to putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and
on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate commerce.
Id. at 142 (citation omitted).

35. 102 S.Ct. at 3463.
36. Id. at 3464-65.
37. Id. at 3464.
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2) the states have a legal expectation, fostered by judicial
decrees and congressional approval of interstate compacts and
other interstate water regulation, that they may restrict water
within their borders; 38 3) the asserted ownership claims of the
state, while not sufficient to totally exclude federal regulatory
power, are sufficient to support a limited preference for a
state's own citizens; 39 and 4) conservation efforts by the states
have given water some of the attributes of a good publicly owned and produced by the states, thereby possibly allowing the
state to favor its own citizens in times of shortage. 40
After outlining these factors, the Court held that the
reciprocity requirement of the Nebraska statute was the only
requirement failing to survive scrutiny based upon the commerce clause. The restriction was held to be "facially
discriminatory" because it acted to impose a total ban on the
export of water to Colorado.41 Citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, the
majority opinion in Sporhase acknowledged that such facially
discriminatory legislation must have a "close fit" with its
avowed purpose in order to be declared constitutional. The
Court held that the appellees had failed to produce an adequate
showing that the reciprocity requirement was "narrowly
tailored" 42 to meet the purposes of conservation and preserva-

tion. However, the opinion strongly suggested that a particularly arid state might be able to support a similar reci38. Id. The Court's declaration that the law recognizes the relevance of state boundaries in
the allocation of scarce water resources has applicability to the state's reservation of
waters apportioned to them by congressional and judicial decrees of equitable apportionment. If a state were not entitled as a quasi-sovereign to reserve for use within its boundaries waters apportioned to it, then reciprocity agreements between the states would
undoubtedly prevail as the means for a state to acquire more water from an interstate
stream. Such a result would defeat the whole purpose of equitable apportionment, which
is to allow each state to enjoy and manage the use of waters within its boundaries consistent with similar uses by sister states. The right to exclusive control of waters equitably
apportioned to a state therefore gives meaning to equitable apportionment decrees and
the idea of equality between the states upon which they are based. Brief of Amicus Curiae
U.S.
,
Colorado and Wyoming at 11, Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,
102 S.Ct. at 3456 (1982).
39. 102 S.Ct. at 3464. See also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978), where the Supreme
Court struck down under the privileges and immunity clause an Alaskan statute requiring preference to resident over non-residents for employment arising from oil and gas
pipeline purposes such as leases, rights of way or permits, to which the state was a party.
437 U.S. at 534. The Court relied upon the commerce clause extensively to bolster its conclusion. Conceding that "[tihe fact that a state-owned resource is destined for interstate
commerce does not, of itself, disable the state from preferring its own citizens in the
437 U.S. at 533, the Court reinforced the conclusion adutilization of that resource ....
vanced by the majority in Sporhase.
40. 102 S.Ct. at 3464-65.
41. Id. at 3465.
42. Id.
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procity requirement, or total ban on the export of water,
where a close means-end relationship between the restriction
and the conservation and preservation rationale was established. 43
Nebraska's third contention, that Congress had authorized
the reciprocity requirement by authorizing the states to impose otherwise impermissible burdens on interstate commerce
in groundwater, was rejected by the Court. Congress may
authorize the states to burden commerce in a manner which
would otherwise be contrary to law. 44 However, as the majoriauthorization must be
ty opinion pointed out, congressional
'4
stated.'
direct and "expressly
Nebraska attempted to infer congressional consent to the
state statutes burdening interstate commerce from a number
of statutes in which Congress had deferred to state water
law.46 The Court clearly stated that, while Congress often
desires to defer to state water law, there was no evidence in
the instant case that Congress had consented to the unilateral
imposition of an unreasonable burden on commerce.47
Justice Rehnquist, joined in dissent by Justice O'Connor,
would have upheld the constitutionality of the reciprocity requirement. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the reach of the
commerce clause is different depending on whether it is applied "affirmatively" to support a federal regulation or
"negatively" to strike down a state regulation. 48 This
negative-affirmative distinction, however, was expressly
struck down by the Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma and again by
the majority opinion in Sporhase. Justice Stevens explained:
"[A]ppellee's claim that Nebraska groundwater is not an article of commerce goes too far: it would not only exempt
43. Id.
44. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
45. 102 S.Ct. at 3466 (quoting New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331,343

(1982)).
46. 102 S.Ct. at 3465. The Supreme Court has described the history of federal-state water

relations in terms of "the consistent thread of purposeful and continued deference to
state water law by Congress." California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653 (1978).
47. 102 S.Ct. at 3466.
48. Id. at 3467 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist asserted, "[Tihe authority of
Congress under the power to regulate interstate commerce may reach a good deal further
than the mere negative impact of the Commerce Clause in the absence of any action by
Congress." Id.
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Nebraska groundwater regulation from burden-on-commerce
analysis, it would also curtail the affirmative power of Congress to implement its own policies concerning such regulation."' 49 Nevertheless, the dissent would have applied the
distinction to determine that under Nebraska law, no "commerce" could properly be said to exist in groundwater.50
The dissent interpreted the holding in Hughes v. Oklahoma
to mean that state statutes which prohibit interstate transfers
of a resource while allowing free intrastate transfers are
discriminatory and thus invalid. By contrast, the dissent
argued, the Nebraska groundwater regulation scheme was so
pervasive that it could not be said that any intrastate or interstate "commerce" existed, and accordingly the regulations
did not impose any discriminatory effects upon interstate
commerce. 5
ANALYSIS

Some observers predict that the Court's decision in
Sporhase could produce a flood of law suits, resulting from the
potential "water rush" as huge energy companies attempt to
reach across state lines and appropriate water necessary for
agriculture and other beneficial uses.5 2 Others foresee that the
impact will be gradual, and that many states may be able to
justify existing restrictions by satisfying the legitimate
governmental objectives set forth by the Supreme Court.53
A careful examination of the decision, viewed in light of
the long-term congressional policy to promote and uphold
regulation of water by the states, 54 reveals that the states will,
in fact, retain considerable authority and ability to fashion
49. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3463 (1982).
50. Id. at 3468 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The minority also cited Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 533 (1923), and West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911), in support of
the distinction between natural resources reduced to private possession, and the
Nebraska water regulation which did not allow ownership by a private party, but rather
restricted individuals to the "reasonable use" of groundwater. 102 S.Ct. at 3468 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52. Russakoff, Wheat FarmerStuns the West with Water Suit, Washington Post, Sept. 12,
1982, at Al, col. 4.
53. See HearingBefore the Subcomm. on Water Resources of the Comm. in Envir. and Pub.
Works, United States Senate, Regarding Sporhase v. Nebraska (Sept. 15, 1982) (statement of Carol E. Dinkins, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, Justice Department).
54. See supra note 46.
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legislation regulating both the export of water outside their
borders and other intrastate water uses which may affect interstate trade.
A New View on the Nature of Water
To many of the western states, the Supreme Court's
holding on the commerce clause question may have appeared,
at first glance, to be surprising and without precedent. Recent
case law suggests that the holding is, in fact, consistent with
the Court's approach to commerce clause questions generally.
5 5 the
Beginning with the landmark case of Wickard v. Filburn,
Court has developed a line of cases which hold that the commerce clause reaches not only interstate commerce, but also
those "wholly local intrastate" activities which may have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.56 Recent natural
resources cases reflect this analysis. In Hughes v. Oklahoma
the Court, overruling its previous decision in Geer v. Connecticut, held that state assertions of sovereign ownership of minnows located in state waters did not protect state regulations
from commerce clause scrutiny. 57 Shortly before the Hughes
decision the Court had discredited the theory of state ownership of a natural resource (fish) by striking down a provision of
state law which forbade fishing by non-resident federal
licensees, in Douglas v. Seacoast Products.5 8
In Douglas the Court stated:
The 'ownership' language of cases such as those cited by
appellant must be understood as no more than a 19thcentury legal fiction expressing 'the importance to its
people that a state have power to preserve and regulate
the exploitation of an important resource. . . .' Under
modern analysis, the question is simply whether the
state has exercised its police power in conformity with
the federal laws and Constitution.5 9
Accordingly, the Sporhase Court's rejection of the state
ownership theory in favor of a ruling that groundwater is an
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

317 U.S. 111 (1942).
See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
441 U.S. 322 (1979).
431 U.S. 265 (1977).
Id. at 284-85 (citations omitted).
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article of interstate commerce appears to be simply a predictable extension of existing precedent.6 °
The DistinctionBetween Water and Other NaturalResources
in Commerce
The State's interest in preserving and conserving its water
resources was recognized in Sporhase to reach a greater level
of importance than similar concerns when applied to other
natural resources. 6 1 The Court recognized that a state's power
to regulate water in times and places of shortage for health
and safety reasons is at the very core of its police power. 62
State boundaries are more relevant in the allocation of water
resources because of the legal expectation, evidenced by
judicial declarations and congressional approval of interstate
water compacts and other interstate water regulations, that
the states may be able to restrict water within their borders
under certain circumstances.63 Further, unlike the limited
ownership interests of states which have allowed free intrastate trade in natural resources such as natural gas," the
ownership interests of a state which does not allow free intrastate trade in water are heightened, and may support a
limited preference for its own citizens in the utilization of the
resource.6 5 Similarly, conservation efforts by the state may
give rise to a situation where the state may favor its own
citizens in times of shortage. 6
The predominant effect of the ruling that groundwater is
an article of commerce is thus not to dramatically limit a
state's power to regulate water, but rather to assure that the
federal government will be able to regulate water if it so
desiresA7 In the absence of federal preemption, the Court pro60. See Statement of Carol E. Dinkins, supra note 53. It is interesting to note that the
Supreme Court did not rely on the broader test of commerce clause applicability, i.e.
whether or not groundwater regulation "affects" interstate commerce and is thus subject
to commerce clause limitations, but rather worked its way through a lengthy analysis to
reach the conclusion that groundwater is an article of commerce. 102 S.Ct. at 3456-63.
61. 102 S.Ct. at 3464.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas
Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
65. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3464 (1982).
66. Id. at 3465. See supranote 41.
67. Congress has not been deemed to have any ownership over water; therefore in order to
subject water to intensive congressional regulation by virtue of powers granted to it
under the commerce clause, it was necessary to declare water an article of commerce. See
Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3458 (1982).
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nounced, "we are reluctant to condemn as unreasonable
measures taken by a State to conserve and preserve for its
68
own citizens this vital resource in times of severe shortage.
Analysis under the Commerce Clause
The most noteworthy and illuminating portion of the
Court's opinion in Sporhase revolves around the Court's treatment of the question of whether the Nebraska restriction constituted an "undue burden" on interstate commerce. Though
the states may no longer be able to assert control over water
based upon a theory of absolute ownership, Sporhase clearly
left the states with considerable latitude to design statutes
regulating the use of water so long as the goals of conservation
69
and preservation are promoted.
It is likely that most of the state legislation which touches
upon interstate commerce in water will be tested in the
courts.7 0 Given the determinative language of the Sporhase
decision, it is quite possible that many of the states will be able
to justify existing restrictions in terms of the highly legitimate
governmental objectives set forth by the Court.
Legislative Approaches Used by the Western States
State statutes dealing with the interstate movement of
water are varied. 71 Some embargo-type legislation represents
an outright prohibition on the interstate transportation of
water. 72 A second type allows the exportation of water only on
a reciprocal basis. 73 Finally, some states, like Wyoming, require legislative approval prior to the appropriation of water
74
for use outside the state.
The states creating total embargos on the export of water
have generally done so either in response to severe problems
68. Id. at 3464.
69. See 102 S.Ct. at 3465. (Justice Stevens declared, "[a] demonstrably aid state conceivably
might be able to marshall evidence to establish a close means-end relationship between
even a total ban on the exportation of water and a purpose to conserve or preserve
water.")
70. Clyde, State Prohibitionson the Interstate ExportationofScarce Water Resources, 53 U.
COLO. L. REV. 529, 532 (1982).
71. See generally Clyde, Id.
72. See COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-81-101 (1973 & Supp. 1981); MONT. CODE ANN. S 85-2-104
(1981).
73. IDAHO CODE S 42-408 (1977); NEV. REV. STAT. S 533.515 (Supp. 1979); WASH.REV. CODE
ANN. S 90.03.300 (1962).
74. Wyo. STAT. SS 41-3-105, 115 (1977); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 46-5-20.1 (Supp. 1981).
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related to groundwater overdrafts, 75 or in the face of potentially enormous appropriations for energy development, particularly those designed to utilize water in coal slurry
pipelines. 76 A statute that imposes a complete ban on the export of water from within a state may be upheld only where the
state has established that a close means-end relationship exists
between the ban and a purpose to conserve and preserve
water. The restriction must be necessary, i.e., the regulation
purpose,
must be narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate state
77
alternatives.
nondiscriminatory
without adequate
The difficulties that a state imposing such facially
discriminatory legislation may face in response to a commerce
clause challenge were recently enumerated in City of El Paso
v. Reynolds,78 decided January 17, 1983. At issue in City of El
Paso was a New Mexico statute which decreed that no person
shall withdraw water from any underground source for use in
any other state.79 El Paso, which lies near the New MexicoTexas border, is seriously over-pumping the groundwater
basin around the city and seeks to appropriate 300,000 acre
feet of water from wells to be drilled in New Mexico.80 The city
sought to have the New Mexico statute declared unconstitutional because of the excessive burden it placed upon interstate
commerce.
The United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico, construing the Supreme Court's decision in Sporhase
narrowly, struck down the New Mexico statute. The district
court interpreted the Sporhase decision to mean that a state
may discriminate in favor of its citizens only to the extent that
water is essential to human survival. 8 The district court viewed water in precisely the same light as other natural resources
for the purpose of analysis under the commerce clause. The El
Paso court viewed the maximization of "public welfare" uses
the statute, to be
of water in New Mexico, as furthered by
83
"tantamount to economic protectionism."
75. See COLO. REV. STAT. S 37-81-101 (1973 & Supp. 1981).
76. See MONT. CODE ANN. S 85-2-104 (1981).
77. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3465 (1982).
78. Civ. No. 80-730 HB (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983).
79. N.M. STAT. ANN. S 72-12-19 (1978).

80. Clyde, supra note 70, at 533.
81. Civ. No. 80-730 HB, at 28 (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 30.
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City of El Paso was the first water export case to be decided after the Supreme Court's ruling in Spcrhase. While relevant therefore, it is arguable that the district court's conclusion was based upon an unduly narrow reading of Sporhase. In
Sporhase the Supreme Court affirmed that state regulation of
water for health and safety purposes in times of shortage is
vital, and at the core of the state's police power. 84 The Court
held that the state's interests in preservation and conservation
were furthered not only by health and safety regulations, but
also by the requirements that "the withdrawal of the ground
water requested is reasonable, is not contrary to the conservation and use of ground water, and is not otherwise detrimental
to the public welfare." 85 The Court ruled that all three of these
under Nebraska law are constiturequirements as imposed
86
permissible.
tionally
The New Mexico court's assertion that groundwater
should be treated the same as other natural resources for commerce clause purposes 8 7 flies in the face of the language in
Sporhase that specifically notes the difference between water
and other resources. The Supreme Court stated that
Nebraska's ownership interests in its groundwater are
"logically more substantial than claims to public ownership of
other natural resources." 88 The Court recognized the
"relevance of state boundaries in the allocation of scarce water
resources,"89 citing the "legal expectation" that the states
may be able, in some circumstances, to restrict water within
their own borders.9 0 Further, the Court acknowledged that
conservation efforts by the state, not merely for the health of
its citizens, but also for the public welfare and to assure the
reasonableness of groundwater usage, give groundwater some
indicia of a good publicly produced and owned by the state. Accordingly, said the Court, a state may have grounds to assert a
limited preference for its own citizens in times of shortage. 91
Clearly, water is not viewed by the Supreme Court in precisely
84. 102 S.Ct. at 3464.
85. Id. (quoting NEB. REv. STAT. S 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978)).

86. Id. at 3465.
87. Civ. No. 80-730 HB, at 28 (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983).

88. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3464 (1982).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 3464-65.
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the same light as other natural resources such as natural gas or
wildlife. 92 The differences are important, because they are factors which "inform the determination whether the burdens on
commerce imposed by state ground water regulation are
' 93
reasonable or unreasonable."

When a state imposes an absolute ban on the export of its
water, the determinative questions for commerce clause
analysis are whether the restriction has been narrowly tailored
to meet legitimate state interests, and whether adequate nondiscriminatory alternatives to the ban exist. The New Mexico
Court found that New Mexico's embargo statute failed to survive such strict scrutiny, because the evidence presented failed
to show that the embargo would actually preserve water to
meet any future shortages. This is true in part because in New
Mexico an in-state groundwater permit cannot be denied if
unappropriated water is available and no other rights will be
impaired. 94 The state would not be evenhanded in its regulation if a substantially more stringent standard were applied to
out-of-state transfers. The evidence also failed to show that the
intrastate transfer of water in New Mexico was feasible
regardless of distance, as required by Sporhase.95 New
Mexico's groundwater management plan is not highly comprehensive, and the State conceded that it will be at least 40
years before there is a critical shortage of water within the
state. 96 It was not altogether surprising then, that New Mexico
was unable to demonstrate the constitutionality of its statute.
Colorado also has statutes creating total embargoes on the
export of water from within the state. 97 After Sporhase and
City of El Paso, it is doubtful that the state will be able to marshal sufficient evidence to sustain the embargo legislation.
A closer contest may be found in Montana. The Montana
legislature has determined that the use of water for the
transportation of coal in a slurry pipeline is harmful to the
92. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S.
553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
93. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3463 (1982).
94. N.M. STAT. ANN. S 72-12-3E. (1978).
95. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, Civ. No. 80-730 HB, at 34 (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983) (citing
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 102 S.Ct. at 3465 (1982)).
96. Civ. No. 80-730 HB, at 29 (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983).
97. CoLO. REV. STAT. S 37-81-101 (Supp. 1982); CoLO. REV. STAT. S 37-90-136 (1973).
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protection and conservation of the state's water resources.
The legislature has consequently stated that the use of water
for coal slurry transport is not a beneficial use of water.9 8
Since water can only be appropriated for beneficial uses, the
rather novel approach of the Montana legislature serves to
preclude appropriations for the interstate use of water for coal
slurry pipelines.
The statute applies equally to intrastate and interstate
pipelines, and so may not be subject to the "strictest scrutiny"
reserved for facially discriminatory legislation. 9 The fact that
interstate commerce may be affected should not threaten the
statute so long as Montana can demonstrate that coal slurry
pipelines do entail significant adverse environmental impacts
and that the statute's purpose is not purely economic protectionism. 10 0 Also, the traditional power of states to declare certain water uses to be non-beneficial has never been denied by
the courts. 10 The state may well be able to demonstrate that
its legitimate interests are best served by prohibiting the use
of water in coal slurry transport.
The burden placed upon interstate commerce by the Montana statute is mitigated somewhat by the fact that coal slurry
pipelines are not totally prohibited simply because water may
not be utilized as the medium of transport. One commentator
has suggested the truth of this proposition, noting that the
statute does not prevent slurry transport, since other liquids
or gases are potentially available for use in coal slurry
pipelines.102
Reciprocity requirements contained in the laws of other
western states'0 3 are facially discriminatory, and must be
"narrowly tailored" to the conservation and preservation rationale. 0 4 Justice Stevens suggested in Sporhase that a
reciprocity requirement might stand where it could be shown
98. MONT. CODE ANN. S 85-2-104 (1981).
99. As required by Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3465 (1982).
100. Meyer, Sporhase v. Nebraska:A Spur to Better Water Resource Management, ENVTL. F.,
Jan. 1983, at 28, 33.
101. Comment, Coal Slurry:All Quiet on the Western Front?3 PUB. LAND L. REV. 156, 169
(1982).
102. Id. at 170-71.
103. See supra note 73.
104. See Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3465 (1982).
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that the entire state was arid, that the transportation of water
intrastate from areas of abundance to areas of shortage was
feasible despite any distance, and that the importation of
water from an adjoining state would basically compensate for
any exportation to that state. l5
Sketchy statutory support for the reciprocity requirements of some states will require additional evidentiary
or legislative backing in order for the provisions to pass constitutional muster. The enactment of new, carefully articulated
standards according to which the state may require reciprocal
rights, or otherwise control the transfer of water for use outside its boundaries may be the best approach.
The burden that a reciprocity requirement places upon interstate commerce must be, in effect, necessary to serve
legitimate state conservation and preservation ideals. Legislation that specifies the means by which the state's interest in
the health and safety of its citizens, and the protection of noneconomic values such as wildlife and aesthetics will be promoted, may help to protect the legislation from attack as being
mere "economic protectionism." 10 6 Evidentiary support concerning the geographic and seasonal fluctuations in water supplies must be maintained and updated. Proposed water projects which may appropriate large amounts of available water
should be identified as well. Without such further support,
state governments will be in a poor position to regulate diversions by those who wish to take advantage of the less-thancertain status of state laws in the wake of Sporhase.
To validate reciprocity requirements and other facially
discriminatory statutes, the states must marshal substantial
and particular evidence concerning the need for such restrictive legislation.' 07 Many states may be unable at present to
completely justify such restrictions, and may be compelled to
initiate less burdensome controls.
In contrast, state statutes requiring legislative approval
prior to the appropriation of water for use outside the state
105. Id.
106. See City of El Paso v. Reynolds, Civ. No. 80-730 HB (D.N.M, Jan. 17, 1983).
107. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3465 (1982).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss2/3

16

Tallmadge: Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas: State Control of Water unde

1983

COMMENTS

529

may be constitutionally permissible. Wyoming prohibits any
appropriation of surface water or groundwater for use outside
the state without specific legislative approval. 10 8 An additional
statutory requirement mandates legislative examination of a
set of particular factors when the proposed use involves water
as a medium of transportation of mineral, chemical or other
products.109
South Dakota law requires that the legislature must approve any application to appropriate water in excess of 10,000
acre feet annually.110 Common carriers which have failed to obtain such consent are denied the power of eminent domain
under the same act. l 1 '
In Oregon, water located within the state may not be appropriated in any manner for use outside the state except upon
the express consent of the legislature.112 Consent may be conditioned upon whatever restrictions, reservations or terms the
legislature deems appropriate to protect the interests of the
state and its citizens.
These statutes do not represent the sort of facially
requiring application of the
discriminatory' 13 legislation
"strictest scrutiny"1 1 4 under commerce clause analysis.
Legislative approval statutes arguably do not discriminate per
se against interstate commerce, since the legislature may quite
conceivably enact certain conditions or restrictions on out-ofstate appropriations or diversions for conservation purposes
without necessarily discriminating in favor of in-state uses. 1 6
No automatic ban is imposed on exports by requiring
legislative approval. Rather, vesting authority in the
legislature to decide whether to allow the proposed use provides a means by which the states may assure that the pro108. Wyo. STAT. 5 41-3-105 (1977).
109. WYO.STAT. 541-3-115 (1977 & Supp. 1982). The factors set forth in this section apply to a
proposal by Energy Transportation Systems Inc., to appropriate water for use in a coal

slurry pipeline.
110. S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. S 46-5-20.1 (Supp. 1982). It should be noted that South Dakota
does not require legislative approval for applications to appropriate water for energy industry use.
111. S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. S 46-5-20.1 (Supp. 1982).
112. OR. REV. STAT. S 537.810 (1981).
113. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. at 337 (1979).
114. Id.
115. Clyde, supra note 70, at 539.
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posed appropriation is not in contravention to the states' basic
interests in promoting the conservation and preservation of
water. The state legislature may provide the best forum to
assure that a proposed use does not endanger the public
welfare of the state, or the health and safety of its citizens. The
export of water from the state arguably requires the heightened attention provided by legislative approval, since once gone,
water may never again be utilized by the state in any
fashion." 6
The state legislature may examine an application to export
water in view of other pending applications, to ascertain
whether or not the water desired is actually available for appropriation. The legislature may also examine the legitimacy
of the proposed appropriation, and whether or not the
developer is truly able to carry out the proposed diversion, in
order to prevent speculation in water rights.
Similar factors are examined by the State Engineer when
granting in-state appropriations." 7 The requirement of
legislative approval does not destroy the evenhandedness of
the statute's approach; instead it may simply provide the sort
of special treatment the Supreme Court in Sporhase recognized as being legitimate for requests to transport water across
state lines." 8 Because they are not facially discriminatory, the
validity of these state statutes having an effect upon interstate
commerce is determined according to the traditional balancing
test evidenced in Pike v. Bruce Church." 9
Sustaining the constitutionality of a statute such as Wyoming's requires 1) a clear showing of the state's purpose,
through evenhanded regulation, to conserve and preserve
scarce water resources; 2) a showing that the statute interferes or imposes upon interstate commerce only incidentally; and 3) evidence that the local benefits exceed the burdens
20
the statute places upon interstate commerce.
116. In Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3464 (1982), the Supreme Court acknowledged
that the transport of water across state lines may very well deserve "special treatment."
117. WYo. STAT. S 41-4-503 (1977); WYo. STAT. S 41-3-101 (Supp. 1982).
118. See supra note 116.
119. 397 U.S. at 142. The test is stated in note 34, supra.
120. Id.
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In Wyoming, the state purpose to conserve and preserve
water is evidenced by statutory mandates that each appropriation of water be for a beneficial use,121 that the appropriation
not harm the rights of senior appropriators, 122 and that the appropriation not be contrary to the public interest.1 28 These rerequirements sancquirements are not unlike the statutory
12 4
Sporhase.
in
Court
the
by
tioned
Protection of Wyoming's water resources is also
demonstrated by the statutory provision calling for the creation of groundwater control areas in regions where groundwater mining might occur.12 5 The state engineer may refuse to
grant permits for the drilling of any new wells within a control
area.12 6 Other controls which the state engineer is authorized
to implement in order to effect the state policy aimed at conserving underground water include regulation of the distribution and location of wells in critical areas, establishing stanor
sealing
dards for non-wasteful construction of wells, and 12
7
capping wells when waste or pollution is occurring.
Preservation of water is also promoted by Wyoming's
"change in use" statute.1 28 Owners of water rights who wish
to transfer those rights to new uses or different locations may
only transfer the amount of water historically diverted and
consumed, and the proposed transfer9may not in any manner
12
injure other existing appropriators.
The legitimacy of the state purpose to conserve and protect water is easily ascertained by an examination of the factual realities concerning the availability of water in Wyoming.
Although limited supplies of water are available for appropriation in Wyoming, many problems arise in connection with the
121. Wyo. STAT. S 414-503 (1977); WYO. STAT. S 41-3-101 (Supp. 1982).
122. WYO. STAT. S 41-4-503 (1977).
123. Wyo. STAT. S 41-4-503 (1977).

124. The requirements of NEB. REV. STAT. S 46-613.01 (Reissue 1978) that the withdrawal of
groundwater requested is reasonable, not contrary to the conservation and use of groundwater, and is not otherwise detrimental to the public welfare, were held to pose no imper-

missible burden on interstate commerce. 102 S.Ct. at 3464-65.
125. WYO. STAT. S 41-3-912 (1977 & Supp. 1982).
126. WYO. STAT. S 41-3-912(q) (Supp. 1982).
127. Wyo. STAT. S 41-3-909 (1977).
128. WYo. STAT. S 41-3-104 (1977). For an insightful analysis of the Wyoming statute, see
Comment, ChangingManner and Place of Use of Water Rights in Wyoming, 10 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 455 (1975).
129. WYO. STAT. S 41-3-104 (1977).
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distribution of these supplies.130 The consumptive demands for
water occur in the lowlands of mountain valleys and in and
around the towns and cities on the open plains. 131 Most of the
state's precipitation falls in the form of snow in the mountainous areas; nearly 70% of the river flows in the state result
from snowmelt runoff.132 Moving water from areas of
availability to areas where it is needed is at the core of the
Wyoming water problem. Clearly, restrictions and conditions
on the use and transfer of water rights are vital to the effective
management of the resource.
To sustain a constitutional challenge, the Wyoming approval statute must also be shown to place no more than an incidental burden on interstate commerce.133 The Wyoming
legislature has not used its approval power to deny all applications for out-of-state use; rather, the legislature has approved
at least four major appropriations for the use of water outside
the boundaries of the state. 3 4 The approval provisions
arguably seek no more than to protect the "uncontrolled
transfer" of water out of the state. A state like Wyoming that
imposes often severe withdrawal and use restrictions upon its
own citizens does not discriminate against interstate commerce when exercising management over interstate
transfers. 3 5 Indeed, noted the Sporhase Court, "[A]n exemp130. WYOMING WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH INSTITUTE, FIVE-YEAR WATER RESOURCES
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND OBJECTIVES FOR WYOMING 44 (1981).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 45.
133. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3463 (1982) (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970)).
134. WYO. STAT. S 41-3-115 (1977 & Supp. 1982), grants approval to Energy Transportation
Systems, Inc. to appropriate up to 20,000 acre-feet annually for use in a coal slurry
pipeline from Wyoming to Arkansas. Legislative approval allows the state engineer to
issue permits to appropriate the necessary water, so long as certain requirements are
met. The general requirements of the statute are geared to protect and conserve water,
and the rights of other water users. WYO. STAT. S 41-2-601 (Supp. 1982) grants approval
to Chevron Chemical Company to export up to 3,000 acre-feet annually for a phosphate
rock concentrate slurry pipeline transportation system. WYO. STAT. S 41-2-301 (Supp.
1982) provides legislative consent to Texas Eastern Wyoming, Inc. to export up to 20,000
acre-feet annually from the Little Big Horn River and its tributaries for a coal slurry
transportation pipeline. Finally, 1973 WYo. SESS. LAWS Ch. 94 authorizes the state
engineer to approve the application of the Blake Ranch to divert water for use in Colorado, so long as Colorado grants reciprocal authority for similar diversions of surface
water to be used in Wyoming.
135. In Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3464 (1982), the Court, acknowledging the
"legitimate reasons for the special treatment accorded requests to transport groundwater across state lines," declared that "a State that imposes severe withdrawal and use
restrictions on its own citizens is not discriminating against interstate commerce when it
seeks to prevent the uncontrolled transfer of water out of the State."

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol18/iss2/3

20

Tallmadge: Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas: State Control of Water unde
533
COMMENTS

1983

inconsistent with the
tion for interstate transfers would be 136
ideal of evenhandedness in regulation."
It has been argued that the flexibility of the approval process makes it susceptible to abuse, by making applicants
vulnerable to the shifting whims of local political constituencies. 137 Discriminatory effects and applications of the statute
could, of course, render it invalid under a constitutional
challenge. It should not be overlooked that laws which are inherently discriminatory are more subject to invalidation under
a constitutional challenge than are the laws which have a
suspected discriminatory effect. It is much more difficult to
prove the discriminatory application of a statute than to find
discrimination on its face.
One commentator has argued that the Wyoming
legislative approval statute has been applied discriminatorily
in the past. 138 The discrimination alleged was not between
residents and nonresidents, but rather between two successful
applicants, on the grounds that one company was required to
fulfill different conditions than the other. 3 9 Such "conditioning" may be necessary to assure that the state's health, environmental, and other interests connected with water
resources development are met. Some uses may logically incur
greater obligations in order to serve these state interests.
The evidence does not show that the Wyoming statute
discriminates against interstate commerce by forbidding or
placing an undue burden on out-of-state transfers. Rather, the
Wyoming approval statute appears to show a demonstrable,
legitimate state interest which only incidentally interferes
with interstate commerce. If challenged, the statute has a
substantial chance of being upheld.
FederalAuthority Over Water
Although water resource management in the West has
always been primarily a state responsibility, the federal
136. 102 S.Ct. at 3464.
137. Comment, Do State Restrictionson Water Use by Slurry Pipelines Violate the Commerce
Clause? 53 U. CoLo. L. REv. 655, 671 (1982).
138. McDaniel, Commerce Clause and Water Availability Issues Concerning Coal Slurry
Pipelines, 12 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 533, 542 (1979).
139. Id.
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government also has legitimate interests in the allocation of
the region's water. The federal government acts as proprietary owner of large tracts of western lands and may
dispose of its property, both land and the water arising
thereon, just as any other proprietor may. 140 The government
has an additional role as a soverign entity exercising specific
powers granted to it under the United States Constitution.
While Congress may release its proprietary interest in land
and water and allow the states to control appropriation and
use thereof, it may not delegate its sovereign powers to any
state. 1 41 Congressional power to regulate commerce is one
1 42
such inherent power.
The holding in Sporhase that water is an article of commerce is not one which Congress may subsequently overrule.
It is well established that Congress may authorize activities
which would otherwise place an impermissible burden upon interstate commerce, 143 but it is equally clear that Congress may
not use its power to restrict its own affirmative authority
44
under the commerce clause.1
The Supreme Court has not declared that the United
States has any ownership interests in water that is presently
subject to state control. The focus of the Sporhase ruling was,
instead, that Congress has discretion to regulate water uses
which touch upon interstate commerce, and that Congress
may not eliminate that discretion.
Water issues are critical to questions of future development and growth in the West, so it is understandable that the
states resist attempts by the federal government to upset the
nature of the federal-state relationship. In the face of growing
energy problems, state prohibitions upon the interstate use of
water for energy development could invite the federal intervention that state and local politicians and populations seek
145
to avoid.
140. U.S. CONST. art. IV, S 3, cl. 2.
141. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 143 (1851).
142. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, S 8, cl. 3.
143. 102 S.Ct. at 3466 (citing New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 343
(1982)).
144. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956). It should be pointed out that
the failure of Congress to exercise its full powers under the commerce clause will not
preclude it from doing so at some future time. Id.
145. Clyde, supra note 70, at 557.
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As previously noted, Congress has generally been quite
willing to defer to state authority and control of water
sources. 146 However, examples of past congressional
deference to the applications of state water law may have a
somewhat weakened value in determining the future of
federal-state relationships in the wake of the Sporhase decision. The system of "cooperative federalism" delineated by the
Court in the reclamation project area may become a thing of
the past. This threat to the security of state water law systems
has left important water rights vulnerable to changes in con147
gressional policy.
Congress may change the existing federal-state balance by
explicit legislation which serves to preempt the otherwise valid
exercise of state police power. 148 The Sporhase ruling on the
commerce question opens the door for federal preemption,
since it provided the necessary relationship between an
and federal control over interstate water
enumerated power
149
development.
If Congress decided to modify the portion of the Court's
Sporhase decision susceptible to legislative oversight, there
are several avenues Congress could follow. Acting pursuant to
its authority under the commerce clause, Congress could
preempt state legislation and attempt to regulate the interstate transfers of water through the exercise of new federal
law. Or, Congress could pass legislation that established
guidelines concerning what types of state legislation would be
permissible, or it could pass a law that listed all current state
statutory export (or burdensome) restrictions and authorize
them pursuant to its commerce clause power. Congress might
even enact legislation encouraging, the establishment of interstate compacts on the theory that such compacts are the
best legal avenue for the resolution of interstate water
150
disputes.
146. See supra note 46.

147. Backman, Public Lqnd Law Reform-Reflections from Western Water Law, 1982 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 1, 45-46.
148. See generally TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 376-91 (1978).

149. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 92 (1907).
150. Statement of Carol Dinkins, supra note 53. See also Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at
3466 n.20 (1982) (recognizing the historical preference given to the enactment of interstate compacts as means for solving interstate resources disputes).
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Attempts by Congress to define what types of state
restrictions are permissible may actually lead to a result which
would be more troublesome to the states than the Sporhase
decision itself. One reason the Court will infer deference to
state water law-the fact that Congress hasn't actedvanishes once Congress asserts its authority over groundwater
pursuant to its power under the commerce clause. From the
states' point of view, it may thus be desirable for Congress to
avoid enacting any immediate remedial legislation. This is particularly true in light of the fact that the Court in Sporhase left
open the possibility that the western states may be able to
satisfy the commerce clause by enacting new restrictions or
recasting their existing regulations. 1
Specific conflicts in determining whether federal preemption applies are usually resolved in accordance with congressional intent, national policies, and the degree to which the
state laws are inconsistent with federal law. 152 In order for
Congress to actively and effectively defer to state water law,
' 53
its intent must be "expressly stated. '

Coal slurry pipeline legislation presently pending before
Congress may be indicative of the continuing Congressional intent to defer to state water law. The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works has attempted to provide an express statement of Congressional intent to preserve the
primacy of state water laws, presumably even those which
could impede the development of the pipelines, despite the fact
that coal slurry pipelines are deemed to be in the "national
interest."1

54

Recognition of congressional deference to state water law
is also illustrated by a recent Justice Department opinion
which analyzes and reaffirms the notion that deference to
state water law is the rule, and preemption the exception,
when resolving federal-state conflicts over water.' 55 The
151. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91.
152. See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
153. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S.Ct. at 3466 (1982) (quoting New England Power Co. v. New
Hampshire, 455 U.S. at 343 (1982)).
154. S. 1844, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) ("Coal Distribution and Utilization Act of 1982").
155. WATER LAW NEWSLETTER, No. 2, 1982, at 15.
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opinion further suggests that the proper focus in resolving
156
state-federal conflicts centers upon congressional intent.
It appears that congressional intent will continue to be the
deciding factor in determining which level of government has
authority to regulate water. Though Sporhase substantially expands the federal government's ability to control water located
within the states, it is unlikely that Congress will vigorously
assert that power in the immediate future.
CONCLUSION

The Court's decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel.
Douglas, has created much anxiety in the western states,
prompting state legislatures to consider new or amended
water laws which will constitutionally justify restrictions on
the use of water for interstate commerce. The states' anxiety
comes in part from what David Aiken, a water law specialist at
the "specter of a full social
the University of Nebraska, calls
15 7
transformation."
and political
Yet, certain realities of the states' "ownership interest"
remain. The longstanding congressional role of deference to
the application of state water law, and the states' "highly
legitimate and unquestionably important" purpose to conserve
and preserve a rare and special resource, may serve to validate
those state laws which are demonstrably necessary to achieve
the desired results.
Congress is not likely to invoke the ruling to intervene in
state water regulation where the states can marshall substantial support for their conservation programs. Without specific
congressional consent to state regulation, however, the federal
government's ability to intervene is undeniable.
Sporhase fits into the pattern of changes which are reshaping the West. The Court, Congress, and the states will all play
a role in determining just how profoundly these changes will
affect the distribution and control of water.
ANNE B. TALLMADGE
156. Id. at 16.
-157. Russakoff, supra note 52, at A9, col.3.
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